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Abstract
International organizations face a trade-off between the need to replace poorly
performing leaders and the imperative of preserving the loyalty of influential or
pivotal member states. This performance-politics dilemma is particularly acute in
UN peacekeeping. Leaders of peacekeeping operations are responsible for ensuring
that peacekeepers implement mandates, maintain discipline, and stay safe. Yet, if
leaders fail to do so, is the UN Secretariat able and willing to replace them? We
investigate newly collected data on the tenure of 238 civilian and military leaders in
thirty-eight peacekeeping operations, 1978 to 2017. We find that the tenures of
civilian leaders are insensitive to performance, but that military leaders in poorly
performing missions are more likely to be replaced. We also find evidence that
political considerations complicate the UN’s efforts at accountability. Holding mis-
sion performance constant, military leaders from countries that are powerful or
contribute large numbers of troops stay longer in post.
Keywords
international peacekeeping, political survival, international organization,
accountability
1University of Gothenburg, Sweden
2King’s College London, United Kingdom
3University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom
Corresponding Author:
Magnus Lundgren, University of Gothenburg, Box 100, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden.
Email: magnus.lundgren@gu.se
Journal of Conflict Resolution
1-29





Do international organizations (IOs) hold staff in key positions accountable for
performance? In appointing and dismissing senior officials, IO secretariats are for-
mally required to hire and fire on merit, but they frequently weigh considerations of
merit against the anticipated reactions of the official’s country of nationality. This
presents IOs with a dilemma. If power and patronage of IO member states offset
considerations of merit and can shield officials from accountability for poor perfor-
mance, it may undercut organizational effectiveness and weaken legitimacy. At the
same time, IOs need to preserve the loyalty of member states, whose support is
crucial for their operational activities, by keeping their nationals in prestigious or
lucrative positions for a significant amount of time.
The dilemma between politics and performance has been investigated in national
bureaucracies but is rarely explicitly discussed, let alone systematically studied, in
IOs. A key reason is that, at the international level, officials’ performance is difficult
to observe and member states’ interest in specific positions difficult to gauge. The
case of UN peacekeeping allows circumventing these barriers. In UN peacekeeping
missions, top civilian and military leaders are expected to prevent violence, protect
civilians, ensure peacekeepers’ discipline, and keep peacekeepers safe. Mission
performance can thus be evaluated using indicators such as battle deaths, civilian
victimization, peacekeepers’ misconduct, or casualties among peacekeepers.
Furthermore, since countries contribute troops to specific missions voluntarily, we
can estimate their ability and interest in exerting influence regarding particular
leadership positions.
We investigate whether political influence or performance affects how long
peacekeeping leaders stay in post. Using event history analysis, we examine newly
collected data on 238 civilian and military leaders in thirty-eight UN peacekeeping
missions between 1978 and 2017. We make three key findings. First, civilian and
military leaders’ tenures are varyingly sensitive to mission performance. Whereas
Force Commanders in poorly performing missions face a higher likelihood of
replacement, we observe no such association for Special Representatives of the
Secretary-General. Second, Force Commanders are particularly unlikely to endure
in post in missions that fail to stop armed violence, while sexual misconduct by
peacekeepers does not affect the likelihood of replacement. Third, political consid-
erations influence the tenure of peacekeeping leaders in several ways. Leaders from
large troop contributors or permanent members of the Security Council are more
likely to endure in post, and they may also be partly shielded from the effects of poor
mission performance.
These findings enhance our understanding of IOs in several ways, further devel-
oped in the conclusion. To begin with, this is the first quantitative study of how
accountability operates in UN peacekeeping. While the academic and policy litera-
tures have discussed peacekeepers’ misconduct and their alleged inaction in the face
of violence, prior research has not provided a systematic understanding of how the
UN Secretariat reacts to such incidents. Second, we demonstrate the existence of
politics-performance trade-offs in IO senior staffing, extending this debate from the
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national level to the international domain and from the discipline of comparative
politics to International Relations. Our results indicate that IO secretariats face a
balancing act between preserving the support of key member states by keeping their
nationals in the job and increasing effectiveness by replacing leaders of poorly
performing units, programs, or missions. The peacekeeping case suggests that this
problem is particularly salient in IOs that depend on voluntary provision of resources
by member states. Finally, our evidence points to specific forms of states’ meddling
in international bureaucracies, expanding our understanding of informal influence in
IOs and suggesting how it may undermine accountability. An implication is that
some prominent frameworks of accountability in global governance (Grant and
Keohane 2005), which assume a separation between internal bureaucratic account-
ability and external accountability vis-à-vis IO principals, may underestimate the
degree to which the two are interconnected.
Performance and Accountability in International
Bureaucracies
In recent decades, IOs have become increasingly autonomous, which is reflected in
expanding regulatory powers (e.g., Hawkins et al. 2006) and the establishment of
large supranational bureaucracies (e.g., Bauer and Ege 2016). These developments
have triggered an interest in IOs’ handling of their expanding autonomy and a
growing literature on issues of accountability (Woods and Narlikar 2001; Verdirame
2011; Campbell 2018; Hirschmann 2020). Different forms of accountability exist in
IOs. Chesterman (2008) distinguishes between legal accountability, emerging from
compliance with rules, and political accountability, emerging from behavior con-
sistent with the preferences of political principals. In an expansive inventory of
international accountability structures, Grant and Keohane (2005, 36) identify
“hierarchical” accountability as a characteristic of bureaucracies in which “[s]uper-
iors can remove subordinates from office, constrain their tasks and room for discre-
tion, and adjust their financial compensation.” This is also known as “managerial
accountability” (Wouters, Hachez, and Schmitt 2011; Kuyama and Fowler 2009). It
differs from what Grant and Keohane call “supervisory” accountability, which is the
relationship between IO’s member states and its bureaucracy.
Much of the discussion of accountability in IOs has focused on supervisory and
other forms of political accountability. For that reason, most of what we know about
managerial accountability emerges from research on national bureaucracies. A key
finding in that literature is that appointments of senior bureaucrats are subject to so-
called politics-performance trade-offs (Egorov and Sonin 2011; Gallo and Lewis
2012; Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis 2014; Aaskoven and Nyrup 2019).1 These
trade-offs pit political considerations against considerations of merit. On the one
hand, executives making bureaucratic appointments seek to reward political allies
with lucrative and prestigious postings. On the other hand, executives need appoin-
tees who are qualified to perform. This dilemma is mirrored in decisions on
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bureaucrats’ retention and dismissal. While research shows that performance
explains the length of service of cabinet ministers (Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding
2007), studies of turnover of ambassadors (Arias and Smith 2018) and senior
national bureaucrats (Dahlström and Holmgren 2019) highlight political
considerations.
There are many parallels between national and international bureaucracies,
despite the fact that research on national and international public administration has
evolved largely separately (Fleischer and Reiners 2021). Crucially, both national
civil services and IOs purport to hire, retain, and promote staff on merit. However,
since IOs are composed of individual states, there are inevitable collective action
problems, and what is individually rational for one state may not be rational for the
membership as a whole. In particular, member states lobby IO secretariats for staff
and leadership appointments for their nationals (Dijkstra 2016; Kleine 2013), some-
times in situations where nationals of other countries might be more suitably qual-
ified. As a result, citizens of powerful and rich countries are over-represented in
international bureaucracies (Parı́zek 2017; Novosad and Werker 2019; Oksamytna,
Bove, and Lundgren 2021). This is one way in which powerful states exercise what
Stone (2011) calls informal influence.
These studies suggest that politics-performance trade-offs might be present in
IOs, although they have not been explicitly conceptualized as such. While research
has shown that international bureaucracies may anticipate member states’ reactions
(Martin 1993; Pollack 2003; Oksamytna and Lundgren 2021), to our knowledge,
there exist no studies that investigate politics-performance trade-offs in IOs expli-
citly and empirically. This gap in the literature can be attributed to several difficul-
ties associated with researching this issue. First, studies have analyzed member
states’ influence on IO staffing in institutional contexts where performance is dif-
ficult to observe, leading them to focus on staff appointment rather than retention.
Second, studies have focused on areas where member states’ preferences regarding
specific staff positions are opaque, making it difficult to evaluate dynamics of
patronage: for example, Kleine’s (2013) study of the European Commission inves-
tigates member states’ interest in staffing sectoral departments but not specific posts.
The case of UN peacekeeping allows circumventing these barriers. First, several
indicators of peacekeeping missions’ performance are observable. All peacekeeping
leaders face the same primary task of reducing violence, and the decline in conflict is
a standard criterion for assessing UN missions. There are also clear expectations
regarding the safety of peacekeepers and civilians. Second, because UN peacekeep-
ing needs the support of powerful countries for mission authorization, and because it
relies on voluntary and mission-specific troop contributions, we can observe mem-
ber states’ influence regarding specific leadership positions. Such influence can be
compared to the patronage dynamics in national bureaucracies: the way in which
loyalists are appointed or kept in the job by an executive at the national level is
similar to how citizens of powerful or pivotal states obtain or retain peacekeeping
leadership posts in IOs. Third, the general procedures of appointments and contract
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(non)renewal in UN peacekeeping are comparable to other IOs that operate under
the unified personnel policies and practices of the International Civil Service Com-
mission (Renninger 1977). In short, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy combines
transparency with regard to performance, power, and patronage that is rare else-
where with dynamics of bureaucratic survival that are likely to exist in other IOs.
Performance and Accountability in UN Peacekeeping
UN peacekeeping operations typically have a dual leadership structure, divided
along civilian and military lines. The senior civilian officer, the Special Represen-
tatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG), is the top diplomat responsible for overall
mission leadership, liaising with conflict parties, and ensuring compliance with UN
standards. The senior military leader, the Force Commander (FC), is responsible for
the deployed forces, including the planning and execution of military operations.
Both types of leaders are appointed and replaced by the UN Secretary-General, the
head of the UN Secretariat and the organization’s chief administrative official. In
making these appointments, and in deciding whether to retain peacekeeping leaders,
the Secretary-General has considerable discretion but, as set out in Paragraph 101 of
the UN Charter, should consider appointees’ ability to meet “the highest standards of
efficiency, competence and integrity.” In short, peacekeeping leaders should be
hired and fired on merit.
However, member states may interfere in the appointment process in order to
secure peacekeeping leadership posts for their nationals. Oksamytna, Bove, and
Lundgren (2021) demonstrate that member states’ institutional power, troop contri-
butions, and proximity to the conflict-affected country increase the chances of
securing such an appointment. States exert significant effort in placing their citizens
in such positions, which may enable them to achieve certain goals: as UN officials
know, “the amount of capital that individual Council members would be willing to
invest in order to get their person into whatever high-level position is a signal.”2
Achieving those goals requires that nationals stay in those posts for some time, thus
delivering a return on their state’s investment of political or material capital.
Furthermore, peacekeeping leadership positions are a source of valuable diplo-
matic or military experience for individuals: such jobs are among the most presti-
gious in the UN bureaucracy and international diplomacy. For example, Sergio
Vieira de Mello left his post of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, one
of the highest-profile positions in the UN system, to serve as the SRSG in Iraq in
2003.3 Accruing the benefits of exposure, training, and connections requires not only
getting a peacekeeping leadership post but also keeping it for a respectable amount
of time.
While both individual diplomats or commanders and their member states have an
interest in durable tenure at the helm of a UN peacekeeping operation, the UN
Secretariat needs to project an image of a responsible institution that holds its staff
accountable for underperformance. The issues of performance and accountability in
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peacekeeping are more complex than in many other areas of the UN’s work, con-
sidering that UN troops can inflict harm by both using and refusing to use force. UN
peacekeepers can thus be held responsible for both actions and omissions.
Starting with omissions, peacekeeping missions will be considered to underper-
form if they fail to achieve their main goals. All peacekeeping leaders face the same
primary task of reducing violence, and the decline in armed conflict is a standard
criterion for assessing peacekeeping performance (Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017;
Bove, Ruggeri, and Ruffa 2020). Additionally, there are clear expectations regarding
peacekeepers’ contribution to civilian safety. A reduction of civilian victimization is
an important consideration in assessing peacekeeping effectiveness (e.g., Hultman,
Kathman, and Shannon 2013; Bove and Ruggeri 2016; Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson
2019; Bove, Ruggeri, and Ruffa 2020; Di Razza 2020). Protection of civilians, an
integral element of multidimensional peacekeeping mandates since 1999 (Oksa-
mytna 2021), can be seen as a legal obligation of peacekeepers—and, by extension,
of their civilian and military leaders (Wills 2009; Di Razza 2020). Finally, peace-
keeping leaders should ensure force protection and prevent attacks on peacekeepers.
Avoiding such attacks is essential for not jeopardizing the achievement of core tasks,
as they may cause some troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to withdraw their
contingents or make peacekeepers reluctant to leave the base, decreasing the mis-
sion’s ability to reduce violence and prevent civilian victimization. Both civilian and
military leaders can be held responsible for force protection failures: whereas civil-
ian heads of mission are “responsible for all aspects of mission management, includ-
ing security aspects,” military leadership also plays an important role in this regard
through operational decisions (Willmot, Sheeran, and Sharland 2015, 16).
In terms of actions, peacekeepers’ misconduct leads to a starkly negative evalua-
tion of their performance in the eyes of the local population and global audiences.
There is a growing literature on peacekeepers’ accountability for sexual violence and
abuse (e.g., Murphy 2006; Freedman 2018). Instances of gross violations committed
personally by peacekeeping leaders, which are thankfully extremely rare, can result
in criminal proceedings,4 or administrative punishment (UN 2015). Of greater rele-
vance is the expectation that leaders ensure that peacekeepers under their manage-
ment or command do not engage in sexual exploitation or abuse (Zeid 2005).
Overall, peacekeeping leaders are expected to ensure that their missions work to
minimize violence, civilian victimization, and security incidents while preventing
sexual abuse by peacekeepers. If they do not meet these expectations, the UN
Secretary-General will have to take corrective action. In ensuring accountability for
poor mission outcomes, replacing an underperforming leader is one of the very few
sanctions available to the Secretary-General. Leadership change is also a type of
event for which data are publicly available and can be collected systematically.
Most often, replacements of underperforming leaders happen quietly when their
contracts are not renewed or a suggestion is made that they leave before the end of
the contract. Recently and unprecedentedly, there have been two cases of peace-
keeping leaders’ public dismissals. The SRSG in the Central African Republic,
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Babacar Gaye of Senegal, was dismissed in 2015 over allegations of sexual abuse by
peacekeepers in the mission under his leadership (Guardian 2015). The following
year, after violence in South Sudan’s capital, Juba, killed dozens of civilians and two
peacekeepers, a UN investigation concluded that “a lack of leadership on the part of
key senior Mission personnel had culminated in a chaotic and ineffective response”
(UN 2016, §7). The Secretary-General discharged Kenyan FC Johnson Mogoa
Kimani Ondieki. The Kenyan government’s reaction illustrates member states’
efforts to protect their nationals: after the FC’s dismissal, Kenya withdrew its peace-
keepers from South Sudan because “[t]he process leading to this unfortunate deci-
sion not only lacked transparency but did not involve any formal consultation with
the Government of Kenya” (Reuters 2016, §6). In Di Razza’s (2020, 12) words, “the
political backlash has been fierce.”
After the incident, the SRSG also departed, but her replacement happened
quietly. While the SRSG “also faced criticism for her handling of the Juba crisis,”
the Secretariat chose to “brand her departure as a voluntary and planned exit from
the mission; a far cry from the public dismissal of the Force Commander” (Spink
2016, 24). All types of departures are recorded in our data. While peacekeeping
leaders might choose to leave themselves, such events are likely rare and randomly
distributed,5 considering the benefits, both monetary and reputational, that accrue to
the officeholders, as well as the stigma associated with a premature departure6 and
pride associated with the ability to endure in post.7
We acknowledge that peacekeeping performance does not depend solely on
mission leadership but also reflects the quality of contributed troops, actions by the
conflict parties, and other factors. Replacing leaders of poorly performing missions
might not always be fair (Spink 2016), and peacekeeping officials have voiced
“concerns about the attributability of success or failure to senior leaders” (Lottholz
and von Billerbeck 2019, 29; see also Di Razza 2020). However, replacements of
leaders of poorly performing missions would represent the Secretariat’s efforts to
promote, or at least appear as promoting accountability. If this were indeed the case,
we would expect poor mission performance to be associated with shorter tenures of
peacekeeping leaders, whom the Secretariat replaces earlier than leaders of solidly
performing missions. This argument leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: Leaders in poorly performing missions have shorter tenures.
At the same time, in light of the literature on politics-performance trade-offs, we
expect the Secretariat to consider factors other than performance in deciding how
long a peacekeeping leader stays in post. For example, Secretary-General Boutros-
Ghali discovered that “bureaucrats enjoying the protection of the Council’s veto-
wielding members raise a peculiar set of problems” (Salton 2017, 168), probably
constraining his freedom to exercise formal powers of dismissal. A Secretary-
General who displeases powerful member states risks a loss of funding (for example,
the US did not pay its UN budget dues in full in the 1990s), institutional deadlock, or,
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like in Boutros-Ghali’s case, a denial of re-appointment. Replacing peacekeeping
leaders from powerful countries before they have had a chance to spend some time in
post can worsen the Secretariat’s relations with those member states. In line with this
dynamic, we expect that leaders hailing from powerful countries are more difficult to
replace than leaders from less powerful states, including in situations when the
mission underperforms. We thus seek to test the following second hypothesis:
H2: Leaders from powerful countries have longer tenures.
Next to the pressure from powerful countries, we expect the Secretariat to be
susceptible to the influence of TCCs. The TCCs’ ability to supply or withhold
troops, which they provide voluntarily, gives them leverage, which has already been
shown to matter for peacekeeping leadership appointments (Oksamytna, Bove, and
Lundgren 2021). By similar logic, when contemplating replacement of a peace-
keeping leader from a major TCC, the Secretariat has to consider the implications
for that country’s willingness to volunteer troops. The abovementioned example of
Kenya’s withdrawal from South Sudan following the dismissal of its FC is a case in
point. Even in cases of quiet replacements, such decisions can have serious reper-
cussions if the peacekeeping leader hails from a major TCC. India’s withdrawal
from Sierra Leone in 2000 was partly “prompted by Indian unhappiness with
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s decision to replace General Jetley as the Force
Commander” (Murthy 2007, 161). In line with this reasoning, we expect that influ-
ence flowing from mission-specific patronage in the form of troop contributions can
make leadership replacement more difficult, and also mitigate the negative effect of
poor performance. We thus propose the third hypothesis:
H3: Leaders from large troop contributors have longer tenures.
Assessing whether mission performance, power, or troop contributions affect the
length of tenure of civilian and military leaders of UN peacekeeping operations will
reveal whether the UN Secretariat is able and willing to replace leaders that do not,
for one reason or another, deliver results that are publicly expected, or whether the
Secretariat prioritizes keeping powerful or important countries content by retaining
their nationals in peacekeeping posts for a substantial amount of time.
Data and Methods
To evaluate our theoretical expectations, we construct a dataset on the tenure of 89
SRSGs and 149 FCs in thirty-eight UN peacekeeping missions between 1978 and
2017.8 This dataset covers the majority of UN missions deploying during this time
(see online appendix, Table A1) and records biographical details of leaders, the dates
of tenure, and mission characteristics. Figures A1 and A2 in the online appendix
provide details on the distribution of leadership posts across nationalities (see also
Oksamytna, Bove, and Lundgren 2021).
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Given our interest in measuring the time to leader exit, we employ an event
history framework (Cox and Oakes 1984; Freedman 2008). Event history analysis
is conventionally used in International Relations to study the time it takes for an
event to occur, such as the duration of a peace agreement or how fast the UN can
generate sufficient troops for its peacekeeping missions (Lundgren, Oksamytna, and
Coleman 2020). In our case, we study the duration of leaders’ tenures. The unit of
analysis is mission-leader-month. Leaders enter the risk set upon appointment and
exit at the time of departure from post. We code the event history of leaders as 0 until
they depart, 1 in the month of departure, and otherwise missing. Officials that
remained in post at the end of 2017 are right-censored.
Figure 1 exhibits data on the length of tenure of FCs and SRSGs. We note that few
FCs last longer than thirty-six months and extraordinarily few more than forty-eight
months; the tenures of SRSGs are somewhat longer. The median FC tenure is
twenty-one months, whereas that of an SRSG is twenty-five months. The distribu-
tion of FC tenures exhibits peaks at twelve and twenty-four months, likely indicating
a pre-agreed rotation schedule, a pattern that is less clear for SRSGs. Overall, we
observe that most leaders exit at other times, suggesting variability that may reflect
replacement driven by considerations of performance, power, and contributions.
Figure 2 presents the associated Kaplan-Meier estimates. While the FCs and
SRSGs have similar survival rates in the first year of tenure, SRSGs are subsequently
at a lower risk. The twenty-four-month survival probability is 0.41 for FCs and 0.49
for SRSGs. At thirty-six months, the survival probabilities are estimated at 0.10 and
0.17, respectively. The difference is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. In
other words, civilian leaders tend to stay in post longer than their military counter-
parts. While these statistics do not provide evidence in favor of any of our hypoth-



































Figure 1. FCs and SRSGs tenures.
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diverging mechanisms, possibly reflecting differentiated responsibilities and varia-
tions in their countries of origin. (SRSGs are more likely to come from powerful
countries).
To evaluate our expectations regarding the determinants of FC and SRSG
tenures, we use Cox proportional hazards models, estimating the probability of
leader exit in a given month, provided that exit has not yet occurred. Since observa-
tions are clustered within missions, they are likely to exhibit correlated outcomes
due to unobserved factors that affect all leaders of the same mission. To model such
cluster-specific homogeneity, we cluster errors on missions and, in further exten-
sions, include shared frailty terms for missions, equivalent to random effects in a
multilevel framework (Therneau and Grambsch 2013). On the explanatory side, we
include covariates to represent our theoretical concepts of mission performance,
power, and contributions, as well as measures to control for confounding factors.
When it comes to measuring mission performance, we employ two separate
approaches. In the first, we create a mission performance index, weighing in three
key indicators of how well a mission meets the expectations about its ability to
prevent negative events: battle deaths, one-sided violence against civilians, and
attacks against mission. While these are imperfect proxies that might not capture
Figure 2. Kaplan-Meier estimates of leadership tenures.
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mission performance fully or accurately, the Secretariat cannot ignore such visible
and salient measures when evaluating peacekeeping leaders’ performance.9 A
broader measure of performance is motivated by an expectation that several factors
simultaneously contribute to the perception of mission success (or a lack thereof). In
the second, disaggregated approach, we examine whether and how constituent indi-
cators of the index extend or shorten the duration of leaders’ tenures. This approach
also allows assessing the role of peacekeepers’ discipline, as measured by the
absence of sexual exploitation of the local population (Karim and Beardsley
2016). We do not include it in the main index because the data are less complete
than for the other components; it also pertains to the behavior of peacekeepers per se,
rather than outcomes that are not always within peacekeepers’ control.
The construction of our mission performance index was inspired by several
considerations (cf. Greco, Ishizaka, and Tasiou 2018). From a conceptual stand-
point, we wanted an index that could help us identify leaders of underperforming
missions, relative to missions that performed better with respect to the key goals of
UN peacekeeping. From a methodological standpoint, we wanted a performance
measure that allowed for comparison across leaders in different missions, took
diverse local conditions into account, and was based on observable and readily
available indicators.
The mission performance index incorporates three constituent indicators. The
first and the second indicators relate to the mission’s contribution to a positive
security environment, operationalized as battle deaths and civilians killed in one-
sided attacks, both from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (Sundberg and
Melander 2013).10 The third indicator relates to performance in terms of the safety of
personnel, operationalized as attacks against peacekeepers (Henke 2019). These are
suitable performance indicators not only because they reflect the core components of
peacekeeping mandates, but also because they tend to receive extensive media
coverage, making bad performance visible to the public.
To enable comparison across leaders in different missions, the index is con-
structed with an emphasis on the relative deterioration in mission performance
during a leader’s tenure. This is achieved in four steps. First, for each leader, we
create three time-series, representing the cumulative count of battle deaths, attacks
against civilians, and attacks against the mission during the leader’s tenure. Second,
we standardize each leader’s time-series of cumulative counts, so as to place them on
a comparable scale. Third, for each leader, we sum the three standardized time-
series, producing one leader-specific time-series that represents the accumulation of
adverse events during the leader’s tenure. Fourth, to ease interpretation, we inverse
the scores (so that good performance equals high scores) and rescale so that 0 is the
lowest value and 100 the highest value. Leaders in missions that have few or no
adverse events will have scores at or close to 100, whereas leaders in missions that
have many and substantial adverse events on these metrics will have lower scores.
As with the other variables, the index is measured on a monthly basis (see Figure A5
in the online appendix).
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The mean monthly mission performance index score is seventy-six for FCs and
sixty-six for SRSGs. Good performers—leaders whose missions experience no
dramatic worsening on the three variables—tend to have scores above ninety,
whereas bad performers (here defined as the lowest quartile) have scores lower
than fifty.
While we use a rather simple and intuitive measure, we recognize that perfor-
mance indices can be constructed in several other ways. In our robustness checks,
we present results for two alternative indices, which imply different assumptions
about how adverse events affect the Secretariat’s perceptions of mission
performance.
More broadly, our indicators constitute a first step toward measuring mission
performance, and a few caveats and clarifications are in order. First, both our index
and the disaggregated measures focus on negative events, implying that “good
performance” is only captured to the extent it involves the prevention of such events.
In UN peacekeeping, this is a reasonable assumption, but other policy domains may
require alternative approaches.
Second, it is a measure of mission performance and not of individual perfor-
mance. We recognize that a mission’s ability to stem violence or prevent other
negative events does not depend only on leaders’ actions. However, we expect that
trends in their average survival in post, over many missions and longer periods of
time, will be shaped by such factors on account of their overall responsibility for the
mission.
Third, violence in the host country can be compounded by factors other than
mission performance. A mission may lack the mandate or means to address violence;
even a perfectly resourced operation experiences some adverse events. However, the
selected indicators match what peacekeeping operations seek to accomplish through
skillful “good offices” of the SRSG and an effective military strategy by the FC.
Even if only a portion of the observed violence is related to mission performance,
variation in that portion of violence, across missions and leaders, allows us to
evaluate its correlation with the risk of replacement.
Fourth, there is a possibility of endogeneity. A leadership change can affect the
level of violence in the host country if, for example, it temporarily reduces the
mission’s ability to operate effectively. However, our data indicate that SRSGs and
FCs are rarely replaced at the same time and that leaders are often immediately
followed by a successor. Another risk is that local actors intensify violence in
anticipation of a leadership change. But given that most transitions are unforeseen
and not publicly communicated before they are executed, this is likely rare. It is also
possible that tenure, per se, affects the performance of the operation because leaders
accumulate knowledge and learn how to make the mission successful. Yet, this is
likely to have an impact only in the very long run. In light of these concerns, and
although we control for a large number of potential confounding factors, our esti-
mates do not necessarily demonstrate a causal mechanism and should thus not be
interpreted in a causal fashion.
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To evaluate H2, we assess the power of the leader’s country based on two
indicators. The permanent five members of the Security Council (P5) enjoy a dis-
proportionate influence in UN peacekeeping (Allen and Yuen 2014). Economic
resources provide another form of power that can be wielded to influence staffing
decisions in IOs, for example, by supporting costly lobbying for appointments. We
operationalize economic resources based on Gleditsch’s (2002; updated through
2017) GDP data.
To evaluate H3, we measure mission-specific troop contributions based on
monthly UN data. The variable records the number of troops supplied by the leader’s
country to the observed mission, reflecting its direct contribution. In our sensitivity
tests, we evaluate the impact of general troop contributions, operationalized as the
sum of troops provided by a country, across all UN missions and years, through to
the year of observation.
In H2 and H3, we expect power and troop contribution to have an independent
effect on leaders’ tenure. Additionally, we expect them to mitigate or reduce the
effect of bad performance on tenure by shielding nationals from accountability.
We include a vector of controls to adjust for possible confounding. Our perfor-
mance measures emphasize longitudinal shifts in performance within an observed
leader’s tenure. Nevertheless, recognizing that missions experience different
enabling and constraining circumstances, we account for missions’ mandates, which
Di Salvatore et al. (2020) show to have a considerable effect on peacekeeping out-
comes. In particular, missions with a Chapter VII mandate are likely to have author-
ization for the use of force, thus making them riskier than other missions.
Since our sample includes terminated missions, we include a variable for end of
mission, coded as 1 in the last month of the mission’s existence. Since leaders’
tenure ends at this date, regardless of performance, failing to control for this event
would skew the results. Drawing on qualitative research, we also coded for leaders
appointed in an acting (or interim) capacity; such leaders naturally have shorter
tenures. In our extended tests, we also control for the impact of fixed-term con-
tracts, by including variables coded 1 for the twelfth and twenty-fourth month of a
leader’s tenure.
While individual characteristics are difficult to observe, we control for one
leader-level feature. Previous experience is coded as 1 for leaders who have
previously headed or commanded a UN peacekeeping mission in our data and 0
otherwise. The expectation is that more experienced leaders are likely to survive
longer in post.
Several variables are right-skewed. To reduce the risk that outlier observations
are disproportionately influential, we log all continuous variables (after adding 1 to
all values) in Table 1. All performance variables and troop contributions are mea-
sured at the monthly level; other variables have yearly measurements. Summary
statistics (Table A2), correlation matrices (Table A3), and the distribution of key
independent variables (Figure A3) are reported in the online appendix.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We present our results in Tables 1 and 2. Models 1 to 4 in Table 1 relate to FCs and
Models 5 to 8, which are analogously specified, to SRSGs. Models 1 and 5 are base
models, including our composite measure of mission performance and variables
representing power and contributions. In Models 2 to 4 and 6 to 8, we add interac-
tions, seeking to gauge how the association between performance and survival is
conditioned by power and contributions. In Table 2, we disaggregate the mission
performance index and estimate coefficients for each constituent indicator, as well
as for sexual exploitation by peacekeepers. The online appendix contains a wider set
of results, as detailed below. We report log hazards; coefficients with a negative sign
represent lower risk (and therefore longer tenures) and vice versa.
If H1 is correct, we would observe a negative association between mission per-
formance and exit probabilities. Leaders in missions that perform well should be at a
lower risk of exit; those in underperforming missions should be at a higher risk. As
indicated by the negative coefficients on the mission performance variable in Model
1, our data support this intuition for FCs, which means that military leaders in
missions that experience a larger number adverse events are at higher risk of replace-
ment. The base SRSG model yields a negative point estimate, as expected, but the
coefficient is not statistically significant. This suggests that the tenures of military
and civilian leaders vary in their sensitivity to mission performance.
To illustrate the relationship between performance and FC tenures, Figure 3 plots
the predicted hazards.11 The slope indicates that good mission performance is asso-
ciated with a lower hazard rate (and hence, a lower probability of exit). While
dramatic shifts in performance can be associated with very substantive changes in
the predicted hazard, most observations are focused in the middle of the range. In
this range, all else equal, moving from the first quartile (sixty-three) to the third
quartile of the performance index (ninety) is associated with a 15 percent reduction
of the hazard rate for FCs. In substantive terms, an FC in a mission maintaining a
first quartile performance level can look forward to an estimated twenty-three
months on the job, compared with twenty-six months for an FC in a mission at the
third quartile. (Figure A4 in online appendix illustrates this difference in the form of
predicted Kaplan-Meier curves).
Consistent with H2, the P5 covariate is negatively associated with exits in Model
1, pointing to longer tenures for commanders from countries that are permanent
members of the Security Council. This might suggest that in relatively rare cases
when the P5 provide FCs (see Figure A2), they seek to protect their nationals to
realize strategic objectives they have in the host country, including through the FC
appointment, and shield the reputation of their military. At the mean level of mission
performance, the predicted tenure is thirteen months longer for FCs who come from
the P5, which is consistent with the expectation that the P5 lobby the Secretariat for
longer tenures for their nationals (Figure 4). There is no evidence of a similar
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systematic association for SRSGs, further reinforcing the impression that the tenures
of these two leader types are governed by partly different mechanisms.
The positive coefficient on GDP in Model 1 indicates that FCs from more eco-
nomically powerful countries have shorter tenures than FCs from other countries. As
can be seen in Model 4, there is no significant association between GDP and SRSG
tenures. These results are contrary to our expectation and suggest that the theorized
mechanism—that economically powerful countries successfully lobby to retain their
leaders in post—lacks support in the data.12 Understanding the negative association
between GDP and military leaders’ tenures will require further research. It is pos-
sible, for example, that poorer countries, which might derive financial benefits from
UN peacekeeping, or at least obtain other benefits of peacekeeping participation at a
low cost (Coleman and Nyblade 2018), are more adamant about shielding their
leaders in order to protect their reputation and ensure continuing invitations to
participate in peacekeeping missions.
Examining H3, we find some evidence in favor of our proposition that mission-
specific troop contributions extend leaders’ tenures. The estimates vary in precision,
but the negative coefficient in Model 1 indicates that larger contributions are asso-
ciated with longer tenures for FCs (significant at the 90 percent level). Substantively,
increasing contributions from 0 to 500 (6.21 when logged) troops reduces the FC
hazard rate by about 20 percent. We observe no significant association for SRSGs.
The stronger association for FCs is consistent with the informal understanding that
FC appointments are closely linked to mission contributions (Jakobsen 2016),
whereas those of SRSGs are less so.
Our theory suggested that performance, power, and contributions have independent
effects on the length of tenure. It additionally suggests the possibility of conditional
effects, i.e. that leaders from powerful countries or large TCCs are treated differently,
despite serving in missions with the same level of performance. To gauge how the
impact of performance is conditioned by power and contributions, we estimate inter-
action models (Models 2 to 4, 6 to 8 in Table 1). This allows us to examine if the effect
of performance is mediated by political considerations. The negative coefficient on the
interaction in Model 2 suggests that coming from a P5 country provides a further
protective function for FCs, diminishing the impact of weak mission performance on
the risk of exit.13 By contrast, interacting performance with GDP or mission-specific
troop contributions suggests that the coefficient for performance is not significantly
altered by these factors. For SRSGs, we find no evidence that the coefficient for
performance is conditioned by power or contributions.
Turning briefly to our control variables, we note that leaders appointed in an
acting capacity have shorter tenures, as expected. All else equal, the predicted
median tenure of an acting FC is a mere five months and twelve months for an
acting SRSG. Leaders with previous experience have longer tenures, on average, but
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the estimates are too noisy to raise our confidence in a systematic association.
Chapter VII mandates do not appear to be correlated with leaders’ tenures.
Overall, our theoretical propositions receive mixed support in this first round of
tests. With regard to FCs, the data are consistent with key parts of our theoretical
argument. For SRSGs, the evidence is considerably weaker. None of the privileged
variables is a systematic predictor of the duration of SRSG tenures. Thus, next to the
results regarding FCs, a key finding is that the tenures of FCs and SRSGs are
varyingly sensitive to observable mission conditions. The divergence between FCs
and SRSGs underlines the unique responsibilities of the two roles: They are held
accountable for different aspects of mission performance, a question to which we
return below. It is also possible that SRSGs are evaluated on the basis of idiosyn-
cratic and “positive” achievements, like promoting inter-ethnic understanding or
resolving gridlocks between local actors, which are less likely to leave an imprint
on a measure geared toward picking up adverse events.
To further deepen our analysis, we report, first, an extensive set of robustness
tests, including alternative performance measures, and, second, an extension in
which we disaggregate our performance index into its constituent parts.
Figure 3. Percentage change in hazard rate for FCs as a function of mission performance.
Predicted values with 95 percent confidence intervals. Calculations based on Model 1.
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Robustness
To ensure that our results are not driven by particularities of model specification,
sample selection, or operationalization, we undertake a number of robustness tests
(Tables A4 through A15 in the online appendix).
First, we construct two alternative measures of mission performance and re-
estimate our main models (Table A4). These measures differ from the base measure
by emphasizing recent performance (defined as the last three months) and “good”
and “bad” performance, respectively. The “good” variable is the count of recent
months in which a mission has at least 50 percent fewer adverse events than its
historical average. The “bad” variable is the count of months with at least 50 percent
more adverse advents than the historical average. Given the way these measures are
constructed, the number of observations shrinks, so we interpret the results with
additional caution. Table A4 shows that FCs in missions that perform better than
their historical average are more likely to stay in post, whereas FCs in missions that
perform worse than this average are more likely to be replaced. Using these alter-
native measures reinforces our beliefs that the duration of FC tenures is sensitive to
mission performance. As for SRSGs, recent “good” performance does not appear to
affect tenures whereas “bad” performance lowers the risk of exit. Taken together,
these results reinforce the conclusion that FCs and SRSGs differ not only with regard
Figure 4. Predicted tenures of FCs, P5 and non-P5 countries. Prediction based on Model 1;
all other covariates held at mean or reference level.
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to their average time in office but also with regard to the determinants of their
tenures.
Second, we examine whether accountability rose to prominence after the end of
the Cold War, as peacekeeping missions became more active and riskier. We re-
estimate our models excluding observations prior to 1990. The results in Table A5
indicate that the results are indeed robust.
Third, we examine additional possible confounders (Table A6). Countries with
extensive diplomatic networks can lobby in support of their nationals, while expe-
rienced diplomatic corps could translate into higher quality of appointees, leading to
better overall performance. Per capita income could also confound the analyses if
wealthier countries provide appointees with a potential for better performance due to
investments in education and training. General troop contributions by TCCs, across
all previous missions, could be another overlooked source of influence. Controlling
for these additional variables, however, does not significantly affect our main
results.
Fourth, we exclude the last six months of each mission from the sample (Table
A7). When a mission is about to wrap up, the UN might be reluctant to replace top
officials, regardless of mission performance, because of transition costs and the
difficulty of finding qualified individuals for a job of very limited duration. All key
results are robust to this alteration of the models.
Fifth, we test if our results hold up if we remove four observer missions from our
sample (Table A8). These are smaller missions with limited mandates that may
differ from the rest of the missions. Excluding them does not change the behavior
of our key variables.
Sixth, our results could be driven by outlier observations. This concern is most
clear with regard to the mission performance variable, which contains some outliers.
Removing the observations with the ten lowest performance scores and the observa-
tions with perfect performance (no negative events) does not significantly change
the results (Table A9). The main exception is that, with the best performers removed,
we observe a positive relationship between performance and tenure length for
SRSGs, suggesting wider support for our theory in this subset of the data. Removing
observations that are statistically influential (deviance residual exceeding 2.5) yields
similar results (Table A10).
Seventh, we replicate Table 1 using alternative modeling strategies. This
involved a discrete time (logit) model and alternative methods for ties (Breslow
rather than Efron) (Tables A11 to A12).
Eighth, we test for fixed-term contracts using discrete time logit models (Table
A13). Including a time-varying variable coded as 1 in months twelve and twenty-
four of a leader’s tenure indicates that FCs, especially, are at higher risk in such
months. This indicates the presence of formal rotations for FCs (as already illu-
strated by the descriptive figures).
Finally, all reported variables satisfy the proportional hazards assumption except
GDP and previous experience in the main SRSG model (Model 4, Table 1).
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Including time interactions for these variables, as the literature suggests (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004), does not change the key results (Table A14). The
results also indicate that SRSGs from countries with a higher GDP are likely to
endure longer in post, but this pattern attenuates with time. To show that our inter-
action results are not sensitive to multicollinearity, we also present a table in which
the performance variable has been standardized (Table A15).
Disaggregating Performance
While a broad index likely provides the most credible measure of how mission
performance is perceived, disaggregating the index into its constituent parts, as
we do in Table 2, allows us to identify specific drivers of early exits. We again
estimate identically specified models for FCs and SRSGs and add two models that
include a covariate for sexual exploitation, which was excluded from the main index
for reasons of data availability.
The results suggest that the components of our performance index are varyingly
associated with leader exits.14 Leaders in missions that fail to stem violence, as
measured by cumulative battle fatalities, have shorter tenures. The coefficient is
positive in Model 9, indicating that increasing fatalities predict shorter tenures for
FCs. For SRSGs, there is a positive association, but it is not statistically significant.
Since violence reduction is the core goal of UN peacekeeping, these results
strengthen our belief in a relation between mission performance and
leader tenures. The stronger result for FCs is also plausible: battle deaths are linked
to military performance, where FCs rather than SRSGs have more control. Figure 5
plots the predicted probabilities. Moving from a first quartile (0) to a third quartile
fatality level (400 fatalities) is associated with an 18 percent higher risk of FC exit;
moving to 1,000 fatalities increases the risk by 40 percent.
We note that for FCs, the other two performance indicators are estimated
close to zero and with high variance, suggesting that their relationship to tenure
varies considerably. This would imply, first, that the previously observed result
for the performance index is largely driven by the strong impact of battle deaths
and, second, that accountability is more selective than expected. Likewise for
SRSGs, these results indicate that the weak association between the performance
index and tenure is likely due to the underlying indicators pulling in different
directions. While battle deaths and attacks against the mission are unrelated to
tenure length, attacks against civilians are negatively associated with SRSG
exits.
Finally and importantly, our results demonstrate that sexual exploitation by
peacekeepers is not associated with shorter tenures of peacekeeping leaders. We
recognize that the estimates are based on incomplete data, so we have limited
statistical power, but the negative coefficient in Model 10 means that FCs in mis-
sions with an incidence of sexual violence have longer tenures than missions with-
out, all else equal. The effect size is small and it is significant only at the 90 percent
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level, but the results are clearly counter to theoretical as well as ethical expectations.
Likewise, while the measure is positive for SRSGs, indicating that sexual exploita-
tion by peacekeepers increases the risk of SRSG exit, it is not statistically significant.
Despite the single example of dismissal (see above), these results lend credence to
the accusations that the UN is not doing enough to stop sexual abuse by Blue
Helmets (Zeid 2005; Freedman 2018).
Table 2. Survival of FCs and SRSGs (Disaggregated Performance Measures).
Dependent Variable
FC Exit SRSG Exit
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Battle-related fatalities 0.402*** 0.085
(0.116) (0.060)
Attacks against mission 0.088 0.173
(0.108) (0.161)
Attacks against civilians 0.141 0.214*
(0.124) (0.127)
Sexual exploitation 0.003* 0.001
(0.001) (0.0004)
P5 country 0.947** 1.835** 0.620* 0.244
(0.376) (0.873) (0.322) (0.710)
GDP 0.164*** 0.239** 0.073 0.329***
(0.052) (0.113) (0.064) (0.115)
Mission troop contribution 0.022 0.110 0.004 0.042
(0.029) (0.078) (0.055) (0.063)
Previous experience 0.157 0.632 0.278 0.584*
(0.200) (0.391) (0.193) (0.349)
Chapter VII 0.247 0.908 0.044 0.557
(0.173) (0.593) (0.221) (0.401)
Mission end 3.732*** 24.448*** 3.757*** 24.171***
(0.217) (0.514) (0.322) (0.404)
Acting 3.770*** 1.666***
(0.532) (0.327)
Observations 2,496 918 1,705 749
Log Likelihood 378.449 82.452 207.148 56.022
LR Test 141.631*** 31.133*** 101.257*** 24.824***
Note: Log hazards. Negative coefficients signify lower risk of exit. Robust errors clustered on missions.
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Conclusion
Does performance of senior leaders in international organizations affect the length of
their tenure? Are efforts to ensure performance accountability hampered by con-
siderations of power or patronage? This is of crucial importance in UN peacekeep-
ing, where missions can not only fail but also inflict harm on people they are sent to
assist. Based on data from thirty-eight peacekeeping missions, 1978 to 2017, we
investigated whether the UN Secretariat holds peacekeeping leaders accountable for
mission performance and whether such decisions are influenced by political
considerations.
Our findings suggest that the UN Secretariat balances performance and politics.
On the one hand, the evidence demonstrates that military leaders’ tenures are sen-
sitive to overall mission performance, in particular to mounting battle deaths. This
suggests that the UN Secretariat is making efforts to ensure performance account-
ability, especially with regard to the core peacekeepers’ goal of violence reduction.
On the other hand, these efforts appear to be frustrated by political concerns. We find
that permanent Security Council membership and troop contributions lengthen
Force Commanders’ tenures, suggesting that adequately performing military leaders
are unlikely to be prematurely replaced if their country is a major UN decision-
maker or partner. We also find that the replacement risks that flow from mission
Figure 5. Percentage change in hazard rate for FCs as a function of battle deaths during
tenure. Predicted values with 95 percent confidence intervals. Calculations based on model 9.
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underperformance are reduced for Force Commanders from powerful countries. In
addition, the differences between military and civilian leaders are more pronounced
than we would expect. While civilian heads of mission are considered to have the
overall responsibility for the operation, our findings indicate that mission perfor-
mance does not affect the length of their tenure, in contrast to what we observe for
Force Commanders.
These findings extend our understanding of IOs in three ways. First, we show that
IOs can be subject to the type of politics-performance trade-offs that affect national
civil services. IO bureaucracies are not impartial, technocratic bodies but arenas for
political struggles. While in national bureaucracies, the fault lines are party-political,
the divisions in IOs are between member states with divergent interests: IO secre-
tariats need to anticipate how decisions affect their relationships with up to 193
member states, who wield different types of power and provide different kinds of
support. In deciding on the tenures of peacekeeping leaders, the UN Secretariat
weighs the benefits of replacing a poorly performing leader against the risks that
their country might withdraw political or material support.
Second, by pointing to specific ways in which power and patronage operate in
IOs, our findings contribute to the debate on accountability in global governance.
The ability of powerful states to shield nationals from accountability can have
deleterious consequences for IO performance and legitimacy. While the literature
on unilateral influence argues that powerful states pursue their interests in IOs at the
expense of the rest of the membership (Stone 2011), we extend this argument to
cover pivotal countries on whose resources IOs depend. Major providers of volun-
tary resources can leverage their contributions to protect nationals from replace-
ments. These findings also suggest that Grant and Keohane’s (2005) distinction
between hierarchical accountability, operating between levels of an IO bureaucracy,
and supervisory accountability, operating between the international bureaucracy and
its member state principals, is blurred. Member states, especially if they wield power
or provide key resources, attempt interference that distorts hierarchical
accountability.
Finally, our findings contribute to the debate on accountability in UN peace-
keeping. In the wake of scandals triggered by sexual exploitation or failures to
protect civilians, many wonder whether the Secretariat is willing and able to hold
peacekeeping leaders accountable. While our results suggest cautious optimism, the
Secretariat appears to be more concerned about the performance of military leaders
than their civilian counterparts. This may, however, suggest that civilian leaders are
evaluated based on achievements that are harder to quantify. Additionally, while the
data on the relevant variable are very limited, it is concerning that sexual exploita-
tion is not linked with the length of leaders’ tenure.
Our study demonstrates that further research on performance and account-
ability in IOs is necessary. We suggest two avenues. First, while we detected
politics-performance trade-offs in decisions on UN peacekeeping leaders’
replacement, our knowledge of international bureaucracies can be improved
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by investigating whether this dilemma is present in other IOs. Second, more
precise and nuanced measures of IO leaders’ performance can be developed.
While our choice of variables was motivated by a belief that mission perfor-
mance is a reasonable proxy for individual performance in the eyes of the UN
Secretariat and the broader public, that UN missions’ core objectives focus on
security-related indicators, and that negative events have the most pronounced
effect on perceptions of performance, we invite colleagues to think about other
ways of measuring performance. These can improve our understanding of IO
accountability, especially of civilian leaders who are expected to promote pos-
itive change in subtle and gradual ways by building relationships with national
and international counterparts.
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Notes
1. Also known as “patronage-expertise” or “loyalty-competence” trade-offs.
2. Interview with a UN peacekeeping official, January 2020. The interviews cited here were
conducted in 2020 to 2021 for a project by one of the authors looking at a different aspect
of UN peacekeeping, but some officials volunteered comments on the selection and
tenure of UN officials and leaders.
3. Although the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is a political mission, the exam-
ple demonstrates the value that officials attach to field leadership posts in difficult
environments.
4. UN personnel enjoys various privileges and immunities that mean that most prosecutions
take place in their home rather than host country (UN 2015).
5. In one tragic instance, a Brazilian FC committed suicide, instead of asking for reassign-
ment or waiting for replacement, after “a week of intense public criticism of the
Brazilian-led United Nations Mission in Haiti” (Thompson 2006, §4).
6. When the FC of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) left
his post after only three weeks, media coverage was starkly negative: “The hurried
departure of the Spanish MONUC General Vicente Diaz de Villegas also created a bad
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impression. He arrived in Congo at the end of September and didn’t even last four weeks
in the country before quitting his post” (Knaup 2008 §6).
7. A senior leader, who remained the head of a difficult mission for several years after
several predecessors could not last a year, viewed the length of tenure as a achievement.
Interview with a UN peacekeeping official, January 2021.
8. We extended the data presented in Bove, Ruggeri, and Zwetsloot (2016).
9. A similar approach has been used by Aaskoven and Nyrup (2019, 17) in their investiga-
tion of economic performance and bureaucratic promotions under the Nazi regime. They
do not assume that senior bureaucrats “were promoted directly based on the economic
data,” only that such data were likely to serve as “a reasonable proxy for local economic
performance, which the leadership of the Nazi Party was able to assess.”
10. We refer the reader to this and the following study for a comprehensive discussion of the
variables making up the index.
11. Simulations performed with Gandrud’s (2015) procedures and software. All continuous
covariates held at mean; dummies held at reference category.
12. The result is not due to multicollinearity. We ran diagnostic tests to detect potential
multicollinearity in all our models. In Tables 1 and 2, variance inflation factors (VIFs)
for all independent variables of theoretical interest are well within conservative limits
(<5).
13. Due to the included interaction and the construction of the performance variable (only
positive values), the coefficient on P5 shifts sign in Model 2. If the performance variable
is standardized (Table A15) it remains negative.
14. It is not uncommon for individual indicators of composite indices to exhibit varying or no
relationship to an external variable, even if a correlation between the index and the
external variable exists. Cf. Greco, Ishizaka, and Tasiou (2018).
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